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Background and Context
While there are vast disparities in size and population between Canada
and Trinidad and Tobago (T&T), there are important commonalities
between the two including, ethnic and religious diversity, and
adherence to strong democratic principles. T&T’s Muslim community
represents approximately 5% of the population and has been a strong
fiber in the social fabric since 1845. The actions of a small number of
citizens has however led to T&T being labelled as having the highest
foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) per capita in the western world.
Trinidadians have also been the victims of international terrorism
including 9/11 and the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Kenya. These
issues together with the evolving tactics of terror organizations such as
ISIL, coupled with T&T being a target rich environment, places
terrorism high on the national security agenda.
T&T’s domestic security situation, and increasing compliance with
international standards have both driven legislative strengthening. As
seen in other countries, T&T is subject to the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) system, which evaluates the strength of a country’s laws
for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, the proliferation
of WMDs, and the overall effectiveness of those systems. T&T was
among the first countries in the world to undergo the 4th round of
mutual evaluations between 2014 and 2015 and was re-rated in 2019.
T&T’s technical compliance ratings are at the time of publication,
among the highest in the world with 35 compliant or largely compliant
ratings and no non-compliant ratings (CFATF, 2019). This includes
fully compliant ratings in Recommendations 5 and 6 which relate
directly to terrorism and terrorist financing. T&T’s Anti-Terrorism
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Act, Chap. 12:07, as amended in 2018 now forms model legislation for
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
Major Takeaways
T&T’s situation and experience are not unique but, does provide
precedence for legislative reform and development of implementation
frameworks for other countries, regardless of size. Some of the major
takeaways from T&T’s experience are as follows:
Violent Extremism vs Extremist Violence
Similarly, to Canada1, T&T essentially has two categories of “terrorist
act” under the law:
a. Offences which include motivation by a political, religious or
ideological cause (i.e. violent extremism); and
b. actions which are deemed terrorist acts irrespective of motive,
such as bombing offences (i.e. extremist violence).
While dealing with offences, motive is an invaluable ingredient in
forming an important political statement, it goes beyond traditional
mens rea and poses a particularly challenging element which the State
must prove. Extremist violence offences can therefore, often be much
easier to pursue, allowing the law to cover violent acts the motives of
which might not have been contemplated when the law was first
drafted (e.g. the Incel issue). It also helps to navigate some challenging
definitional issues about whether domestic acts can be strictly termed
“terrorism” by placing the focus on the violent act itself as opposed to
the motive of the actor.

The offence of committing a Terrorist act under section 3 of the Anti-Terrorism
(Amendment) Act (2018), Chap. 12:07 is very similar to the definition of “terrorist
activity” in Section 83:01(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code (2019).
1
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Plugging All the Gaps

Legislative amendments can address two broad categories of gaps:
a. Firstly, where the law does not squarely cover certain activities
(e.g. receiving terrorist training on-line). It should be noted that
while the law often includes broad provisions, such as
“providing support for the commission of a terrorist act” (AntiTerrorism (Amendment) Act, 2018, Chap. 12:07, section 9),
principles of statutory construction (e.g. the ejusdem generis
rule2) could still be raised to narrow the scope of such
provisions, particularly when dealing with new and emerging
threats.
b. Secondly, practical limitations faced by law enforcement. One
clear example surrounds travel to conflict zones and obtaining
evidence of the activities of suspected FTFs once they had
crossed the border from Turkey to Syria. T&T’s amended AntiTerrorism Act modifies the Australian precedent and allows for
the designation of a geographical area which is part of a country
where a listed entity is engaged in hostile activity. Such
designation creates a rebuttable presumption that any person
travelling to that area is travelling for a terrorist purpose (AntiTerrorism (Amendment) Act, 2018, Chap. 12:07, section 15B
(10)). Subject to the requirements of the Act, once law
enforcement proves travel to the designated area, the burden
shifts to the accused to prove the legitimacy of his reasons for
travel.
Using All Available Tools in the Fight Against Terrorism
Countries around the world have been taking a more pragmatic view
of law enforcement in light of challenges in detection, investigation,
A rule of interpretation that where a class of things is followed by general
wording that is not itself expansive, the general wording is usually restricted things
of the same type as the listed items. See more at Duhaime's Law Dictionary (n.d.)
2

Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and
Warfare Volume 2 Issue 3

CASIS Vancouver

4

prosecution and conviction. Reliance on conviction as the only means
of thwarting crime, including terrorism, is not an effective strategy.
T&T has placed increased emphasis on the use of disruptive tools such
as listing and asset freezing where the standard of proof is lower than
for criminal prosecution, particularly in light of challenges faced in
obtaining evidence from conflict zones. In countries such as T&T,
where such measures are applied by judicial process (relying on the
same elements of the offence as in prosecution but to a lower standard
of proof), this also provides an opportunity to build the credibility of
law enforcement in the eyes of the judiciary in a novel area which
impacts on fundamental rights.
Disruptive Tools can be Used for P/CVE
Many of these tools also have a role to play in the “prevent” aspect of
P/CVE. Listing and asset freezing measures have, for example, been
imposed in jurisdictions such as France in cases of teenagers
attempting to travel to conflict zones and were later lifted when they
lost their interest in joining the Caliphate. It is thus important to
consider all the options available in the State’s arsenal to both prevent
and respond to violent extremism.
Target All Players
While the need to target all members of the FTF support network is
widely recognized, intermediaries require special consideration. Many
of the financial or other transactions by which FTFs get support can be
funneled through intermediaries far from conflict zones. It is much
easier for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the country
where the intermediary is operating to identify them as being engaged
in these activities. Taking steps such as listing and asset freezing under
UNSCR 1373 (2001) or proposing names for inclusion on the UN ISIL,
Da’esh and Al Qaida List or the Taliban List can greatly assist other
countries in identifying these intermediaries and tracing transactions to
identify FTFs and other members of their network.
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Companies and non-profit organizations have also long been targets
for abuse for terrorism and terrorist financing. It is therefore, important
to have legal mechanisms to attach personal liability to the individuals
ultimately responsible for such abuse as has been done by T&T 3.
All Intelligence Agencies & LEAs Have a Role to Play
Intelligence suggests that there is a strong possibility of crosspollination between terrorist risks and organized crime even if only in
the supply of arms and ammunition, the illegal movement of terrorists
across borders and financing terrorist operations through criminal
activity. This demonstrates the importance of not getting blinkered by
the concept of “terrorism” and that there is merit in an all-crimes
approach to coordinating intelligence, evidence gathering and
operations. Any one of several agencies may be the first to receive
some intelligence that points towards terrorism even while
investigating some other offence. This makes diagonal cooperation and
information sharing at all levels key.
Protection of the Evidence Gathering Process
Protection of the evidence gathering process is one step in aiding
cooperation, building trust that the mandate of one agency will not be
sacrificed or compromised for the success of another. That sometimes
means withdrawing the case instead of pursuing prosecution. Failure
to do this can prejudice the lives of intelligence officers and law
enforcement assets, as well as the ability to conduct similar operations
in the future. Legislation can also include mechanisms for the
protection of such processes including intelligence provided by
international partners4.

See generally the penal provisions of the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment)
Act (2018), Chap. 12:07 and the Non-Profit Organizations Act
(2019).
4 Section 22B of the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act (2018) contains
examples of such protective provisions in the context of civil
3
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Mechanisms for International Cooperation
It is also important to think outside the box regarding international
cooperation. Mutual legal assistance (MLAT) requests are
indispensable in the transfer of evidence for criminal prosecution but
are also fraught with procedural hurdles. INTERPOL and the Egmont
Secure Web provide alternative mechanisms for timely intelligence
sharing. UNSCR 1373 (2001) also contemplates listing of terrorists
and freezing their assets at the request of another country. As discussed
above, the standard of proof is lower than required for criminal
prosecution and there is greater flexibility regarding what supporting
evidence can be provided. Such requests and intelligence sharing need
not take place via MLAT.
Fundamental Rights & Benchmarking Law Enforcement
Measures
No discussion on legislation can be complete without having regard to
fundamental rights. The Constitution should be the starting point as it
provides an important litmus test not only for policies but also whether
actions taken by intelligence, law enforcement and the military can be
justified or excused. Like many other countries, T&T is grappling with
the issue of how to treat with citizens seeking to return from conflict
zones, and in particular children of FTFs. Just like Canada, the laws of
T&T provide that a citizen may not be refused entry though there is
arguably no legal responsibility to take measures to bring the citizen
home. This is not a simple question but does go to our core values as a
country and civilization. How we respond to this issue can either feed
or counter the narrative terrorists are crafting. Conversely, gaps in the
law and procedures can leave an opening for habeas corpus
applications and legal challenges to the constitutional validity of
actions taken by law enforcement.

remedies including redacting of information provided to Appellants
and otherwise sealing court files.
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Dealing with such matters also eats into law enforcement time as
officers have to attend court and prepare to give evidence. Taking away
time that could be spent on investigations as time is a scarce
commodity in the counter-terrorism sphere. This is another reason why
it is so important to anticipate and plug those gaps as far as possible.
LEAs & the Legislative Process
The final point is how important law enforcement and intelligence
agencies are to legislative development. LEAs are critical to
identifying those threats, gaps in the law and finding workable
solutions. It is therefore, of paramount importance that there be a clear
line of communication and feedback spanning from working level
operators on the ground all the way up to the policy makers if the law
is to provide a framework for effectiveness.
Conclusion
The rule of law is a hallmark of jurisdictions such as Canada and
Trinidad and Tobago. While laws are interpreted as being forward
looking, this has practical limits. In the dynamic realm of counterterrorism there is a critical need for laws to keep ahead of or at least
maintain pace with emerging terrorist threats. Legislators and policy
makers must recognize that law enforcement and intelligence agencies
are at the tip of that spear, identifying legislative gaps to be plugged
and strengths to be built on.
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